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The economic  literature  now accepts  theoretical  the endogeneity  of factor inputs  or because
arguments  that liberal,  outward-oriented  trade  managers  have some  knowledge  about  the noise
policy is better than  restrictive,  inward-oriented  in the production  function.
policies.  Traditionally  such arguments  for the
gains from trade have rested  on the concept  of  Haddad  then estimated  the effect of various
allocative  efficiency.  But a new argument  for  trade  and market-structure  variables  on the level
liberal  trade has emerged:  increased  technical  of TFP, as well as on the deviation  of firm  TFP
efficiency  or productivity.  The best-known  from the efficiency  frontier.  The results are not
attempts  to link trade policy and productivity  are  very sensitive  to the different  measures  of TFP
b r ed on "X-efficiency,"  economies  of scale,  and show that trade openness  has a significant
capacity  use, increased  competition,  and techno-  positive  effect on firm productivity  through:
logical  catch-up.
i  Outward  orientation  from export  promotion.
Haddad  estimates  total factor  productivity
(TFP)  at the firm level using  panel data from the  *  Import  liberalization.
Moroccan  industrial  census in a production-
function  framework  during Morocco's  period  of  * More direct foreign  investment.
trade liberalization  (1984-89).  Haddad  corr.cted
for several  problems  that usually  bias the e.,-  By splitting  the sample  into protected  and
mate of productivity.  The use of panel data  unprotected  sectors,  Haddad  showed  lower
allowed  Haddad  to take into  account  the hetero-  productivity  in protected  sectors.
geneity across  firms. These firm-specific  effects
were tested for randomness.  Differences  between  The results are clear. Trade liberalization  in
large firms and small firms were checked.  She  M3rocco  improved  productivity  in manufactur-
also corrected  for errors in measuring  capital  ing firns, so they  could exploit  their comparative
stock, so common  in data from developing  advantage  and compete  better with foreign  firms.
countries,  and for simultaneity  bias because  of
ThePolicy  Research  Working  PaperSeries  disseminates  the  fndings of work  under  way  in  the Bank.  Anobjectiveof  the  series
is to get these fndings out quickly,  even if presentations  are less than fully polished. The findings, interpretations.  and
conclusions  in these  papers do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
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Theoretical arguments for the preeminence of liberal, outward-oriented  trade policies over
restrictive, inward-oriented  ones are now widely  accepted  in the economic  literature. Traditionally,  these
arguments for the gains trom trade rested on the concept of allocative efficiency, whereby an open
economy is more likely to allocate its resources in areas where it has a comparative advantage. Yet
another case in favor of more  liberal trade has recently  emerged In terms of increased  technical  efficiency
or  productivity. The best known attempts to  link trade policy 3nd productivity are based on  'X-
efficiency",  economies  of scale, capacity  utilization, increased  competition,  and technological  catch-up.
First, trade liberalization  can change the opportunity  cost of leisure in such a way that managers
work  harder. That is, the return to entrepreneurial  effort is increased  by exposure  to foreign competition,
inducing  managers  to make  an extra effort at eliminating  inefficiency.  Second, the existence  of economies
of scale implies that a widening  of the market through  trade should lead to reductions in real production
costs, mainly in terms of increased demand through export expansion. The same argument holds for
increased  capacity  utilization.  Third, in a protected  market dominated  by several  firms, trade reform will
lead to increased  competition,  and hence a reduction  of monopolistic  inefficiency.  Finally, trade reforms
are likely to accelerate  the transition to state-of-the-art  technologies  since domestic producers are more
exposed  to foreign competition.
The handfil of studies which attempted  to quantify  the allocative  gains from liberal  trade policies
found, in general, weak results. However, much  greater benefits  are likely  to emerge from improvements
in productivity.  Unfortunately,  the latter are more difficult  to measure and the empirical literature  does
not offer definitive  evidence  on the effect of trade reform on productivity.  Several recent overviews of
the links between  trade regimes  and productivity  gains (Tybout  1991,  Havrylyshyn  1990, Bhagwati  1988,
Nishimizu  and Page 1987)  suggest that the evidence  is mixed.
IOne possible explanation  for the lack of conclusive  results may depend on how productivity  is
measured.  The empirical  research on industrial  productivity  has suffered  from two major shortcomings.
First, a large number of studies' were based on the traditional measure of total factor productivity,
pioneered by Solow (1957). The consistency  of this measure depends  on the validity  of the assumptions
it makes, namely perfect competition,  constant  returns to scale, and perfect mobility  of all inputs. Yet,
although  the potential biases of the productivity  estimates  which take place when these assumpdons  are
violated have long been recognized 2, litde was actually done to correct for these errors. Second, even
when the problems  of scale economies,  quasi-fixed  factors, and non-competitive  pricing are successfilly
dealt with, the problem of aggregation  remains. Most studies which attempted to estimate productivity
have used macro or sectoral data, implicitly  assuming  that a well defined  prciuction technology  describes
all plants  within  the industry, sector  or country  of analysis.  Tybout  (1991)  points out that "if technological
innovation  takes place through a gradual process of efficient plants displacing inefficient  ones, and/or
through the diffusion of  new knowledge, the approaches to  productivity measurement based on
'representative  plant' behavior are at best misleading. At worst, they fail to capture what is important
about productivity  growth altogether, as Nelson (e.g. 1981) has long argued".
In this study, we will first attempt  to get a consistent  estimate  of productivity  by using industrial
census data and taking into account the heterogeneity  across firms. Second, we will ask the question:
Does  trade liberalization  actually  increase  firm-level  productivity?  In section  11,  the production  model  and
estimation  techniques  will be discussed. In section m, recent changes  in the Moroccan  trade policy will
be reviewed  and evaluated. Section  IV describes  the estimated  TFP. In section V, the estimation  results
of the link between  productivity  and trade are presented.  The conclusion  is given in section VI.
'See for example Nishimizu  and Robinson  (1984) or Krueger and Tuncer (1982).
2See for example  Nishimizu  (1979) or Kim and Kwon (1977).
2II. SPECIFICATION  AND  ESTIMATION  OF A PRODUCIION  MODEL
1. Specification  of the production  models
3:he  pron  techngy:  We begin  with  a stochastic  Cobb-Douglas  production  function:
(1)  Yb,  = A La,  Kf, e
where  the subscripts  i and  t represent  the firm and  the time period  respectively.  The industry  subscript
has been  suppressed.  Y is value  added,  L is labor  measured  in efficiency  units, and K is true capital
stock.  A is the average  level  of Hicks-neutral  technical  efficiency  within  an industry.  a and  0 are scalars
for which  the sum  represents  returns  to scale  for each  industry.  The error term  u,, is assumed  to have
three components:
(2)  us  +  T +  t
where  y, is a firm-specific  effect  that  reflects  firm  efficiency  and management  skills;  Tt is a time effect
common  ^o all firms that reflects industry-level  changes  such as general fluctuations  in capacity
utilization,  technological  innovation,  and returns  to scale; ,, is a random  disturbance  reflecting  the
remaining  noise  across  firms  and time  which  represents  factors  such as luck, weather  conditions,  and
unpredicted  variation  in machine  or labor  performance.
All error component  are unobservable  to the econometrician;  however,  both 1A  and  ,,  may  be
observable  to the managers.  In this case,  they  will be correlated  with  the exogenous  variables  as will be
shown  later. On the other hand, the errors represented  by {,k  are uncorrelated  with the exogenous
variables  and are assumed  to be independently  and identically  distributed  across  firms  and time.  In this
3This  model  is an extension  of Tybout  (1990).
3production  function,  pi wUI  depict  the firm-level  technical  efficiency  which we would  like to esdmate and
wUll  be represented  as a fixed or a random variable.
The producer  behavior: Produeers  are assumed  to maximize  short-run  profits. However, because
of the stocL>stic  nature of the production  process, any given level of inputs will result in an uncertain
level of output, and therefore, in an uncertain profit. The concept of profit maximization  becomes
ambiguous  due to the presence of the random elements. It is therefore necessary  to gear the problem
towards the maximization  of eected  profits. However, this will involve the inclusion  of the variance
of the production  function  disturbance  (see Zellner, Kmenta, and Dreze 1966).  In order to avoid  carrying
along  this extra term, we assume median  profit maximization  (see Kumbhaker  1987).
Furthermore,  we assume  that prices (of output,  labor, and capital)  are either known  with certainty
or statistically  independent  of the production  function  disturbance  term. More specifically,  with a short-
run production  function, capital  is fixed and labor is variable. It becomes  natural to assume  that the price
of capital is known with certainty  since, typically, capital is purchased before it is used in production.
On the other hand, let the expected  real wage for labor be related to its actual  ex=ost value for each firm
according  to the following  equation
(3)  WI,,  =  Whe*.
The expected  short-run profit funcidon  can now be written as
(4)  E(rk)  =E(Y)  -W,,L,,
A Lf. Kf, E(e)  - Wit  E(eb) Lk
4By taking  the first  order  condition  of the  median  profit,  after  decomposing  the error  term  ul,  into
its three components  and assuming  that  ;I and r, are observed  by managers,  we get:
(5)  dx1/dfl, =  (a/L,"Ykev  - Wihe = 0
In logarithmic  terms  we have
(6)  lnL, = Ina + InYj,  - lnWk, - 4 - {it
From equation  6 it becomes  clear  that the demand  for labor  by the firm not only depends  on
output  and wages  in the same  period,  but  a1so on the unforseen  random  elements  in both  production  and
real  wages.  By combining  the first  order  condition  with  the  production  function,  we get the  reduced  form
for employment
(7)  hd,  =  (1-a)  tUna + I1A + PnIC - InW,,  -;4 - -rt  - f 
From equation  7, we can see that labor  is only affected  by the components  of the production
function's  error term that are observed  by managers  (i4 and ,j  and not by the unobserved  component
(,).  Ihereibre, whenever  managers  have knowledge  about a portion of the production  function's
disturbance,  the employment  decisions  will  be affected  by it. In this  case,  simultaneity  problems  arise  and
labor cannot  be taken as exogenous  in the production  function.  However,  if managers  do not have
knowledge  of any portion  of the production  function's  random  element,  equation  7 will be completely
independent  of u, and the simultaneity  problem  is eliminated.
5Whether 4 is observable  or not  to managers,  It will represent  our technical  efficiency  esdmate,
whilo  the sum  of the estimated  a and 0 will represent  an index  of returns  to scale.
2. Estimation  techniques  with  panel  data
Given  the nature  of our data  (cross-section,  time-series),  the empirical  estimations  for this  model
are based  on panel  data  techniques.  The use of panel  data improves  the efficiency  of the econometric
estimates  and allows  the introduction  of firm-specific  effects  (representing  technical  efficiency  in our
production  model)  which  can be treated  as fixed  constants  or as random  variables.  Each case  is briefly
discussed  below',  assuming  for the moment  that  all inputs  are exogenous.
The fixed-effect  model:  The firm-level  productivity  p4  is assumed  to be fixed  and can  therefore
be estimated  as an intercept  which  varies  across  firms  by introducing  dummy  variables.  Assuming  for
simplicity  that  there  are no time-specific  effects,  we have  the following  model
(8)  Y,,  = 14  +  'X;  + tk
where  i =  1, ... , N and  t = 1, ... , T. Y, is the dependent  variable  (output)  for the P flrm  at time t,
X&  is a Kxl vector  of K exogenous  variables  (inputs),  y' is a lxK vector  of constant  parameters,  and  p,
is a lxl scalar  constant  representing  the effects  of the variables  specific  to the i' firm  and invwart over
time'. The ^  for each i is obtained  by including  i dummy  variables  which  take the value 1 for the
corresponding  i and  0 otherwise.  The error  term  t,  represents  the effects  of the omitted  variables  that  are
'More  details  can  be found  in the econometric  literature  on panel  data  (see  for example  Hsiao, 1986).
'Note  that  we are using  vector  notation.
6both time and cross-sectional  variing. Assuming  that ki, Is independently  and identically  distributed, the
OLS estimator  for A is:
(9)  =  - i;V11
where Y, =  (IM)2:Y, and X! =  (lITEXk,  and j-  is the OLS estimator  of y.
The estimator of y obtained from the fixed-effect  model is sometimes called the covariance
estimator or the within-group  estimator, because only the variation within each group is utilized in
forming this estimator. It is known from the literature that the covariance  estimator 4: is unbiased. It
is also consistent  when either N or T or both tend to infinity. However, the estimator for the intercept
A, although  unbiased, is consistent  only when T tends to infinity.
the  random-effect  model: In the previous section, we treated  the firm-specific  technology  effects
pz as fixed constants over time. Alternatively, these firm-specific effects can be treated as random
variables, like El. It is standard  in regression analysis  to assume that factors which affect the dependent
variable, but are not explicitly included as independent  variables, can be appropriately  summarized  by
a random  disturbance.  In the case of panel data where some omitted  effects  vary across time but are firm-
invariant,  and others vary across firm but are time-invariant,  it is natural to assume that the residual  ui
consists of three random components  (see equation 2).
Because the error term has several components,  this model is often referred to as the error-
component  model. Again, we assume th"p ,  = 0 for all t. It is clear that the presence of pi produces a
correlation among residuals  of the same cross-sectional  unit, though the residuals  from different cross-
sectional  units are independent.  Therefore, the least-squares  estimate  of y (irv) is not efficient,  although
7It is stlll unbiased and consistent. In the case of correlated  errors, the generalized-least-squares  (GLS)
estimator  is the BLUE estimator.
Given the GLS estimate of y (ia,|),  we can recover estimates of the individual  cross-sectional
unit's intercept  yj from the residuals.  Following Schmidt  and Sick!ls (1984), if we define the residuals
as 4  =  Yb - X;, j0As,  we can estimate  Az  by the mean, over time, of the residuals for the individuai
cross-sectional  unit i
(10)  (IM  E 4
In our production model, this estimate will represent technical efficiency  at the firm l_vel in a
random-effect  model.
Fixed versus random effects models: How can we decide whether to assume fixed or random
fim-specific effects?  The GLS estimation,  although  being  more efficient  than the within  estimation  when
N is large and T is small, requires the assumption  of uncorrelatedness  between  the error term pi and the
regressors.  If the firm-specific  TFP is correlated  with input  choices, the estimated  regression coefficients
will be biased and inconsistent. On the other hand, the advantage  of the covariance model is that it
protects against a specification  error  caused by such a correlation, but its disadvantage  is a loss of
efficiency  because of the increased  number  of parameters  to be estimated. Following Hausman (1978),
we can test the null hypothesis  that no such correlation  exists [H.: EAjX' 1)  =  01, in order to assess thIi
appropriateness  of using a random-effect  model.
8m. TRADE POLICY  IN MOROCCO
Since 1983, the Moroccan  government  has been pursuing trade liberalization  measures, within
the framework  of the structural reform, aimed at gradually  reducing  the and-export bias and rationalizing
the incentives  to import  substitution.  There are basically  three major import regimes in Morocco:  imnport
taxes, quantitative  restrictions, and reference  prices.
The  import tariff  is  the  most  important taxation instrument for  protection from fbreign
competition  and a significant source of tax revensie There are five individual taxes on imports: the
customs  duty, the special import tax, the stamp duty, the value added tax, and the excise tax.
The customs  duty is considered  the major fiscal instrument  of protection  and is levied on the c.i.f.
value of the imported goods for domestic use. Prior to the liberalization  in 1983, the customs duty was
subject  to a wide variation  both across and within sectors. In 1988, the nraximum  rate declined  to 45%,
with 26 levels. The customs  stamp tax is levied at 10%  of the sum of all other import  taxes administered
by customs. Although  it is applied uniformly,  it magnifies  the protective  effect of both customs duty and
special import  tax. The special import tax (SIT) is a uniform  tariff levied on the c.i.f. value of imports.
In 1988, the SIT and the customs stamp tax were replaced by a Fiscal Levy on Imports (Pr6lbvement
Fiscal  sur les Importations  or FF1), applicable  in principle  to all Moroccan's imports  at the rate of 12.5%
of the c.i.f. value. Contrary  to the declining  maximum  tariff trend observed since 1983, this entailed  an
increase  over the sum of the two abolished  taxes. Although  the intentioE  wvas  to generate  additional  fiscal
revenue  rather than to provide protection, in effect it also confered  protection. The authorities  proposed
uniformity of rates in order to avoid discriminatory  incentives.  However, there are in fact numerous
exemptions  from the PFI (in 1988, over one-fourth  of all imports  were exempt from the PFI).
The value-added  tax is levied on the c.i.f. value of imports inclusive  of customs duty and the PFI
tax and is neutral in terms of resource  allocation. The excise  tax is levied by customs at the port of entry
for a limited  number of products (primarily  petroleum,  petroleum  products, sugar and beer). These two
9taxes cannot be regarded as trade policy instmments, as they apply regardless  of the origin -domestic
or foreign- of the goods and do not create a wedge between  domestic  production  and imports.
Next, consider  the role of quantitative  restrictions  (QRs). They were regarded in the past as the
principal  instrument  of domestic  protection  but were significantly  reduced following  the establishment  of
a generalized  control of imports  in March 1983. An annual General Import Program classifies  goods  by
tariff line into  three lists: goods  in list A which can be freely imported  without  prior authorization,  goods
in list B which necessitate  a prior authorization  to be imported, and goods in list C for which imports  are
prohibited  except in special circumstances.  In 1986, list C has been formally abolished.  Moreover, since
1983, products have steadily  transferred from list B to list A which represented, in 1988, 81.8% of the
imported products (six-digit  CCCN tariff codes) as opposed to 67.6% in 1984 (Table la). Nowadays,
import licenses  for list B goods are almost  automatically  granted and the authorities  consider  that  by 1992
list B would also disappear.
Finally, there is the system of reference price which is, in principle, intended as a safeguard
against dumping  and unfair trading practices  by foreign producers. Reference  prices are limited  to 367
tariff headings  (mainly ceramic  tiles, end-of-series  and second-hand  clothing, used auto-parts).  They are
used to alleviate  the concerns  of domestic  producers  about  the liberalization  of QRs. However, there are
questions  arising about  the reference  prices being actually binding.
Despite  the liberalization  effort, the Moroccan  economy  is still far from being  an open economy.
Simply  looking at the share of restricted  imports and the average tariff rates is misleading  and actually
exaggerates  the extent of the liberalization. First, the share of domestic protduction  whose competing
imports are subject  to licensing is a more meaningfiz  measure  of protection. Indeed, although  the share
of imports which require an import license (List B) dropped to  12.7% in 1988, 40% of the value of
industrial  production is stil protected  by import licenses. With import  substitutes  (which are calculated
°World  Bank President's Report on Structural Adjustment  Lending (1988).
10as the residual  of the industrial  value added after accounting  for the share of exports and non-tradables)
covering about 55% of the industrial sector's value added, this implies that over 70% of the import
substitutes  are still protected  by import restrictions'. Second, the average tariff is not an economically
meaningful  indicator  of protection  since  the lowest rates apply  to items  not produced  in Morocco. Indeed,
although  the import-weighted  average  tariff for the first six months of 1989 was 13.5%, with more than
half of the imports paying 12.5% or below (Table lb), when weighted by the share in production  the
average tariff is above 39%. Finally, reference  prices also disguise restrictions and lack transparency.
They tend to be arbitrary and it Is difficult  to determine  how restrictive they are in practice.
On the export side, the Temporary Admission scheme (import to re-export) has played an
important  role in encouraging  exports and is, in fact, the fastest growing export category: its imports,
which in 1984  amounted  to less than 10%  of total imports, increased  to over 25% by 1988. Nonetheless,
the economy's anti-export  bias remains. Generous tax exemptions  (especially  from value-added  tax) to
such non-tradable  sectors as construction, and price controls in other sectors impede the transfer of
resources  to export and efficient  import-substitution  sectors. Moreover, every tariff represents  protection
from an import-substitution  activity  and a tax on exports. The tariff therefore leads  to an anti-export  bias.
It should be noted that further liberalization  took place after 1989 but does not cover the period
analyzed  in this paper.
IV. ESTIMATION  OF FIRM-LEVEL  PRODUCTIVITY
The empirical analysis of the Moroccan industrial performance during the period of trade
liberalization is based on firm-level industrial survey data collected by the Moroccan Ministry of
Commerce  and Industry. The data cover  the period 1985  to 1989. The surveys  are exhaustive  and include
all enterprises with 10 or more employees, as well as enterprises with less than 10 employees  which
'See World Bank (1990), Morocco:  Sustained  Investnent and Growth in the Nineties
11realized a sales revenue greater than 100,000  dirhams (approximately  US$11,000 at the average 1985-
1989 official exchange  rate). Descriptive  statistics on the Moroccan  manufacturing  sector are provided
in the Appendix.
The multi-factor productivity for  each firm was estimated by  assuming a  Cobb-Douglas
production  technology.  The reason behind  choosing this functional  form lies in the fact that census  data
are unlikely to  support more intricate forms (Griliches and Ringstad, 1971), and that it provides
maximum  flexibility  in dealing with data imperfections  (Tybout, 1990).
Year dummies  were included  in the estimation  to control for macroeconomic  shocks.  The panel
data consisted  of a total of 15,462  observations  which incorporate  5 years and a varying  number  of firms
each year (3933 firms appearing at least once each year). A joint regression on all industrial sectors
would  be meaningless  since  each sector uses a different  technology,  and therefore the production  function
parameters  cannot be expected  to be the same for all industries.  For this reason, the production  function
was estimated  for each industrial sector separately, allowing for the parameters to be different across
sectors. Since the concept of productivity  also relates to the technology used, and since technology is
different across sectors, productivity  in levels is therefore not comparable  across sectors either. In order
to be  able to  make such a  comparison, the deviation of  each firm's  productivity level from the
productivity  of the most efficient  firm (i.e. the firm with the highest productivity)  within each sector was
calculated  and expressed in percentage  term:
(11)  DTFP 5 =  [TFPU  - max(TPP)J I max(rFP)
where i refers to the firm and j to the two-digit  industry. This variable is therefore going to be less than
or equal  to zero, and the smaller it is (or the larger in absolute  value)  the less efficient  the firm compared
to the most efficient  one. The estimations  were generalized  to unbalanced  panels since  we do not observe
12the same number  of firms each year. This matters only in the random-effect  model (see Haddad, 1991,
for details). In order to correct for simultaneity  bias from the labor input  or for measurement  error in the
capital stock, the Instrumental  Variables (IV) method  was used.
The results of the production  function  estimation  using the fixed-effect  model and the IV model
are discussed  in the Appendix. The Hausman  test rejected the null hypothesis  that inputs and technical
efficiency  are not correlated', therefore the random-effect  model  was not used since it does not improve
on the within estimation.
Table 2 shows the mean of the estimated  firm-level  productivity  for each sector. TFPFE Is the
firm-level  productivity  calculated  from the fixed-effect  model, MAXTFPFE  is the highest TFPFE, and
DTFPFE is the deviation  of TFPFE from MAXTFPFE  expressed  in percent. Among  the industries  which
exhibited  the least deviation  of productivity  from their most efficient  firm are electronics, which happen
to have the highest  share of foreign ownership  in equity, and the textile and leather industries,  which are
highly export-oriented  (ses foreign share and export share in Table A.  1).
The deviation  of firm productivity  from the efficiency  frontier  should be interpreted  with caution
since a small dispersion  of productivity  across firms in an industry does not necessarily mean that firms
are at a high level of productivity.  This is especially  true if the industry in question  enjoys high levels
of protection  from external competition  or high barriers to entry due to monopoly  power. This might be
the case of the textile industry  which has the highest  tariff rate of the whole manufacturing  sector, or the
beverage  and tobacco industry which has one of the highest  concentration  ratio (see CR4 in Table A. 1).
Except  for the chemical  products and rubber and plastics, the average dispersion of productivity
from the most efficient  firm based on the IV model is higher than the one obtaineu from the fixed-effect
model. For most sectors, the average level of TFP is lower than the one obtained from the fixed-effect
model.
MTe  null hypothesis  was rejected for all sectors at the 0.005  significance  level.
13V. ESTIMATING  THE LINK BETWEEN  PRODUCTIVITY  AND TRADE POLICIES
1. Estimation  model
After attempting  to obtain  a reliable  estimate  of total factor productivity,  we are now ready to test
the association between trade liberalization  and productivity. This Is done with the etimation of the
following  equation
*(12)  DTFP;, = f(FORSHi,SFORSHkPUBSH&,SHERFSHER  PFSQk,AGEa,AGESQ&,
PRODIVk,GEODISPk,IMPENETk,IMENSQk,EXSHAREik)
where
i refers to the firm and k refers to the three-digit  industry,
DTFP= Deviation  of firm TFP from efficiency  frontier (in %),
FORSH=Foreign share in total equity at the firm level,
SFORSH=Foreign  share in total equity at the sector level,
PUBSH=Public share in total equity at the sector level,
SHERF=Herfindahl  index at the sector level,
SHERFSQ=SHERF  squared,
AGE=Age of the firm,
AGESQ=AGE squared,
PRODIV= Product diversification  index,
GEODISP=Geographic  dispersion  index,
IMPENET= Import  penetratior,
IMPENETSQ=IMPENET  squared,
EXSHARE=Firm export  share in tot-l sales.
The esimations are undertaken at the firm level, with no time series, becae  the productivity
esimates obtained above do not vary across time. All explanatory  variables are means across the 1985
to 1989  period, since this is how the dependent  variable was computed.  We use as the dependent  varable
the deviation of firm productivity  from the productivity  of the most efficient firm within each sector
expressed  in percent. As mentioned  earlier, this measure allows for comparability  of productivity  across
sectors. The regression  can therefore  be estimated  jointly for all sectors. An alternative  way of expressing
14this model is to use the productivity  level (CMP)  as the dependent variable (not as a deviation)  and to
include  sector dummies  in the regression in order to account  for differences  across sectors.
On the right-hand  side, we have  foreign share in ownership  at the firm level (FORSH)  and at the
three-digit  industry  level (SFORSH).  The former should  show whether  firms with high foreign  ownership
perform better than others, while the latter captures any 'spillover'  effect that might be due to the
existence of foreign firms in the three-digit sector. It is often argued that foreign firms are more
productive and use better technologies  than domestic  firms, and that the knowledge  or new technology
embodied in  foreign firms is transmitted to  domestic firms within the industry. Evidence of thils
hypothesis  for the Moroccan  case would be in the form of a significant  positive coefficient  on FORSH
and SFORSH. The foreign share in ownership is measured  as the share of the total equity of the firm
provided  by foreigners.
The public share in ownership (PUBSH)  is also included  as an explanatory  variable. The public
sector has played a major role in the manufacturing  industry since Independence  in 1956. Although it is
often argued that public enterprises  are inefficient  compared  to private ones, this is not clear, I priori,
in the case of Morocco.
Variables  which reflect market  structure  were added. The Herfindahl  index  (SHERF)  controls  for
market power within the three-digit sector level. In principle, the more concentrated the market (the
higher SHERF), the less competition  and hence the lower the productivity.  The square of this variable
(SHERFSQ)  was also included  to capture any non-linear  relationship.
The age of the firm (AGE) is expected  to be negatively  correlated with productivity as it is
usually  the case  that when firms grow older their productivity  de.,lines.  On the other hand, new firms are
not expected to be the most productive either since it usually takes a few years for a new firm to
understand th.  market  and  respond correctly to  it.  In  order  to  capture a  possible inverted U
correspondence  of the age of the firm with productivity,  the square of the age variable was included.
15The product  diversification  measure  (PRODIV)  should  be negatively  correlated  with productivity
as we expect firms which do not specialize  in production  to be less efficient.
Geographic  dispersion  (GEODISP)  captures  the geographic concentration  of firms. In Morocco,
most of the industries  are located  in Casablanca.  This concentration  might  put pressure on the availability
of resources and might crowd out the access of important infrastructure faciities  such as various
transportation  modes. On the other hand, if not excessive,  geographical  concentration  might  be beneficial
to efficiency  since it concentrates  all necessary  facilities into one place. Empirical evidence  will tell us
which of these two forces is actually  stronger. Note that geographic  dispersion is measured  such that the
larger this index, the less the geographic  dispersion,  and the less the regional power.
Finally, we get to the trade variables. Unfortunately  no good measures  of the degree of protection
at the sector level were available. Therefore,  we had to reson !o implicit measures  of protection,  namely
import  penetration  (IMPENET)  and export  share in total sales (EXSHARE).  Recent economic  theory  has
often advocated  that a more open trade would propel productivity. Although this hypothesis has been
tested by a handful  of economists  at the industry level, very few studies investigate  this relationship  at
the firm level, since this sort of disaggregated  data has only recently started to be available. Do less
restrictions  on import  actually  enhance  the competitive  atmosphere  in the manufacturing  sector and hence
increase productivity?  Or does the relationship  between import penetration and productivity  exhibit an
inverted U shape (see Havrylyshyn, 1990)?  On the other hand, is it true that firms which export more
are more  productive  because  they face foreign  competition?  All these hypotheses  will be addressed  in the
upcoming  estimations.
In the regression analysis, we use three models  which differ by their definition  of the dependent
variable. In Model 1, the dependent  variable is the total factor productivity in deviation terms obtained
16from the fixed-effect model where the production function was estimated for each sector (DTFPFE). 9
In  Model 2,  we use the total factor productivity measure (in deviation terms) estimated from the
instrumental  variable model (DTFPIV). In the latter case, only the sectors which passed the selection
criteria (see Appendix) were included. Finally, in Model 3, the dependent variable is the total factor
productivity  (in level) obtained from the fixed-effect  model. In this model, sector dummies are added  to
the regression to account for differences in technologies.  These three models will allow us to check
whether the results obtained are sensitive  to the TFP measure.
2. The results
Tne  results of the first two models, shown  in Table 3, look reasonably  similar, which accentuates
their robustness. Allowing  the production  function  parameters  to vary across sectors as well as firm size
(not shown here), or correcting  for measurement  error and simultaneity  bias did not change the general
pattern of the results. The only difference  between  Model 1 and Model 2 is the sign on public share in
ownership  and geographic dispersion.  These two variables, however, are not significant  in Model 2.
For the analysis that follows, we will therefbre concentrate on Model 1, which explains the
deviation in productivity from the efficiency frontier, and  Model 3,  which explains the level of
productivity.
In Model 1, foreign  share in ownership,  which can also reflect  one kind of openness, is positively
related to  firm productivity: the higher it is, the lower the deviation from the most efficient firm.
Moreover, the positive and significant  coefficient on sectoral foreign investment  suggests an overall
smaller deviation  from maximum  productivity  levels in sectors with a large foreign presence. This result
confirms the spillover hypothesis in which the presence of foreign firms brings on more exposure of
'We also used as a dependent  variable a measure of total factor productivity  Cm  deviation  terms)
obtained  from the fixed-effect  model where the production  was estimated  by sector and by firm size.
The results obtained  were virtually  similar to Model 1 and are not reported here.
17domestic firms to new technologies,  and more incentive to adopt them. In addition, fbreign presence
induces  greater competition  in the corresponding  industries,  forcing inefficient  firms to exit the industry.
However, simply because the dispersion of productivity  is narrower in sectors with significant  foreign
presence does not necessarily  imply that overall levels  of productivity  should be higher in those sectors.
Indeed, the regression in Model 3 which was performed  on the level of TFP (not the deviation)  reveals
that foreign firms have a higher (and significant)  level of productivity,  but the presence  of foreign  firms
in an industry does not cause a higher TFP level for firms in that industry (as can be depicted by the
significant  negative coefficient  on SFORSH), although  it does induce less deviation  of firms from the
efficiency  frontier. This result indicates  that if any productivity  spillovers  exist, they are negative. One
possible  explanation  for this negative  relationship  is that foreign firms are attracted to sectors with a low
level of productivity,  i.e. sectors where foreign firms could exploit their comparative  advantage 1 °.
Firms with a high public share in ownership  exhibit less deviation from the efficiency  frontier
and a higher level of productivity  than firms with a lower share of public investment.  This finding  might
indicate that, despite the financial crisis that resulted, the high-investment  stategy  followed by the
government  in the early seventies  has allowed  public firms to reach a larger size (therefore  taking better
advantage  of scale economies)  and obtain  more  technological  capabilities  compared  to new, private firms.
On the other hand, this result might be capturing high public equity sectors whiih are of national
importance  (such as phosphate  derivatives)  and where the government  usually  aims  at reaching maximum
productivity.  Finally, note that the presence  of public equity  has a higher impact  on productivity  than the
presence of foreign equity, as depicted  by the elasticity  of each variable.
'OFor  a more extensive study on dynamic  externalities  from foreign investment  in Morocco see
Haddad and Harrison (forthc3ming).
18Ihe deviation  of productivity  from best-practice  first increases  then decreases as the age of the
firm increases.  Very young firms and old firms exhibit  the widest deviation  from the most efficient  firm
within  the industry. The elasticities  with respect to age are, however, quite small.
As the Herflndahl  index  -which measures  concentration  or scale effects  at the three-digit  industry
level-  increases, the dispersion  of productivity, as well as the level of productivity,  first increases  and
then decreases. This might show that for low levels of concentration,  firms may not have yet achieved
their  economies of  scale and  therefore exhibit low productivity levels, while for  high levels of
concentration  it is the low degree of competition  which causes low levels of productivity.
As firms are more geographically  concentrated  (i.e. as GEODISP  increases),  they sbow a greater
deviation from the most efficient firm within a sector (i.e. DTFP decreases) and a lower level of
productivity.  Therefore, being  more concentrated  geographically  is not increasing  the level  of competiton
but rather is crowding  out on the use of limited infrastructure  and services. As noted earlier, this surely
seems the case of Casablanca.  In fact, the Government  is putting effort into encouraging  firms to move
out of the condensed  areas. As expected,  the less firms specialize  in production  (the greater the product
diversification)  tho lower the productivity.
Finally, looking at the trade variables, which we are mainly concerned about, they tum out to
be the most significant  of all other explanatory  variables in explaining  productivity  and have the expected
signs as stipulated  by our hypotheses  above.
A higher share of export in total sales increases the level of productivity of the firm, or
alternatively decreases the gap  between the firm's  productivity and the  efficiency frontier in  the
corresponding  industry. Tbis confirms  the hypothesis  that firms selling in external  markets are forced to
increase  their productivity  to stand up to the high competition  found abroad. This is an important  result
considering  the effort put by the Moroccan  authorities  to encourage exports as part of its liberalization
program.  It should  be noted that the direction  of causality  between  export  and productivity  is not known.
19However,  the Sim's causality  test used on the same data for Morocco in Haddad, de Melo, and Horton
(forthcoming)  shows that an increase in exports causes an increase in productivity  and not vice-versa.
Despite  the fact that this is not necessarily  a strong test, it gives an idea of the causality.
Although import liberalization was rather limited in Morocco, the results show that import
penetration  increases  the level of productivity  up to a certain  point after which it has a negative  effect on
productivity.  This pattern can be explained  by the inverted  U-curve  hypothesis  related  to infant industries
which states that limited and selective  protection, or alternatively  moderate import penetration, may be
successful  in enhancing  productivity  as sheltered  markets  permit increased  economies  of scale or capacity
utilization, or both. On the other hand, if import penetration is overwhelming, the domestic infant
industries  may not be able to face  the competition  and a decline  in productivity  will take place. This latter
phenomenon  finds support from our regression as detected  by the negative coefficient  on the square of
import penetration. This negative  effect is expected  to dampen over time (see Havrylyshyn, 1990) but
the period after the start of the liberalization  is not long enough to capture it.
The empirical evidence  on the positive  correlation  between  trade liberalization  and productivity,
controlling  for market structure, is quite strong. This result has rarely found such a robust support,
especially  when dealing with firm-level data. It suggests, for the Moroccan case, that an increrse in
productivity  is generated not only by outward orientation (through export promotion) but by import
liberalization as well. Therefore, given the market structure in  Morocco, the experience of trade
liberalization,  which started around 1984 and consisted  mainly of reducing the anti-export  bias, seems
to bave been beneficial  to productivity  in the manufacturing  sector. On the one hand, firms with a higher
level of exports, by facing more competition  from abroad, have been forced to become  more productive.
On the other hand, import  penetration  also put pressure on domestic  firms, driving them to increase  their
efficiency  or to exit the industry. The results seem  to suggest,  however, that a gradual  opening  of import
is more beneficial  for productivity  than a shock treatment.
20After  assessing  the influence  of trade  openness  on firm  productivity,  we test for thoe  at  tural
stability  of these  conclusions.  Are  these  results  the same  for protected  and non-protected  industries?  The
following  section  addresses  this question.
3. High-protection  versus  low-protection  sectors
Since  an explicit  measure  of protection  could  not  be directly  incorporated  in the above  model,
it is important  to verify  whether  protected  industries  behave  in the same  way  as non-protected  ones.  One
way  of checking  the difference  in behavior  between  these  two  categories  is to separate  the sample  into
high-protection  versus  low-protection  sectors  and estimate  the same  model  for each  one separately.  We
axpect  the direction  of the effect  of trade  openness  to remain  the same  for both  protected  and  unprotected
sectors,  but the magnitude  of this effect  to vary across  these  two categories.
Since tariffs are generally  more binding  than QRs in Morocco 11,  we use as a measure  of
protection  the average  tariff  level  within  a two-digit  sector  for those  years  where  it was available  -1984,
1987, and 1988. Taking  the median  as the dividing  point, sectors were categorized  as protected  or
unprotected  (see  Table  4).
The estimation  results  for each  category  (protected  and  unprotected)  are shown  in Table  4. The
dependent  variable  is the  dispersion  of total  factor  productivity  obtained  from  the fixed-effect  production
model  (DTFPFE).  Controlling  for market  structure,  the results  on trade  variables  show  little  variation
compared  to the previous  model  where  the above  protection  criteria  were  not  used. Indeed,  the signs  of
the coefficient  on import  penetration  aid expoi,  share  remain  the same  in the protected  and  unprotected
sectors.  We will concentrate  on tho analysis  of differences  in the magnitude  of the effects  of trade
variables  on productivity.
"IQRs  have  been  drastically  reduced  during  the liberalization  period  which  corresponds  to our sample.
21Tho difference  in the maniWtude  of the coefficients  on import  penetration  and export  share
between  the protected  and  unprotected  sectors,  although  small,  is quite  revealing.  Firms  which  export  a
larger  share  of their total  sales  have  a higher  productivity  in the protected  sectors  than  in t-e unprotected
ones.  Tbis  might  be due  to the  larger  disparity,  within  the  protected  sectors,  between  firms  which  produce
for the domestic  market  and  fce  little  competidon,  and  fim  wbich  export  and  therefore  bave  to adjust
to heavy  foreign  competition.  Moreover,  the  positive  effect  of import  penetration  on productivi-y  switches
to a negadve  effect  at a lower  level  of import  penetaton for protected  sectors  than  for unprotected  ones
(the  level at which  the slope  changes  from  positive  to negative  is obtained  by setting  the derivative  with
respect  to import  penetration  equal  to zero).  The explanadon  is straight  forward  since,  although  firms  in
both sectors  do increase  productivity  when  02ced  with import  competition,  firms  in protected  sectors,
which  are usualy infant industries,  have less 'resistance' to competition  than firms in unprotected
sectors.  This cannot  but enforce  the finding  that the liberlizadon effect is indeed  strong  and that
protection  creates  inefficiencies.
Another  subtle  difference  between  protected  and  unprotected  sectors  is depicted  in terms  of the
effect  of foreign  share in ownership.  The spillover  effect of foreign investment  is higher in the
unprotected  sectors  than in the protected  ones,  as shown  by the coefficients  on SFORSH.  This  suggests
that, since  protected  firms  usually  have  less  incentive  for being  more  efficient  because  they  are shielded
from external  competition,  they  wiUl  be less responsive  to any transfer  in technology  brought  about  by
foreign-owned  firms. Moreover,  the coefficient  on FORSH  is also  higher  in unprotected  sectors  than  in
protected  ones, suggesting  that even  foreign-owned  firms  take advantage  of the protective  regime  and
enjoy  a  quiet  life.
The Chow  test  was performed  to statistically  test whether  or not  the parameter  values  associated
with  the protected  sectors  (based  on the tariff criterion  only)  are the same  as those  associated  with  the
22unprotected  sectors.  Ihe results  of the Chow  test show  that  there is  indeed  a statistcal  differc  in the
behavior  of protected  sectors  compared  to unprotected  ones.1
VI. CONCLUSION
The effects  of trade liberalization  on total factor  productivity  (Cr  in Morocco  were  estimaed
using  various  measures  of firm-level  productivity,  namely  TFP from a fixed-offect  modd esimating  a
production  function  by sector,  TFP  from  a fixed-effect  model imating a production  function  by sector
and firm size (not reported  here), and TFP from a difference  model  using instumeal  variables  to
correct  for simultaneity  bias and measurement  error in the factor inputs  within  a production  function
framework.  These  different  models  aimed  at getting  an accrae  estimate  of the TFP index.  The results
of the regressions  linking  trade and market  structure  variables  to productivity  showed litde  variation
across  different  TFP  measures.  In all cases,  we get  a strong  posidve  correlation  between  trade  openness,
as measured  by export share in sales and import  penrion,  and firmlevel TFP. Moreover,  by
separating  the sample  into  protected  and  unprotected  sectors  using  the  average  tariff  criterion,  the results
remained  unchanged  in terms  of the signs  of the coefficients  of trade  variables,  although  a difference  in
the magnitude  of these  coefficients  was noticeable  across  the two  categories.  We  therefore  conclude  with
reasonable  confidence  that  trade  openness  has had a significant  positve impact  on firm  efficiency  in the
Moroccan  manufacturing  sector,  this effect  being  present  in aUl  our models  in a robust  manner.
2'The  F-statistc  that  we obtained  with  degrees  of freedom  (12 , 3905)  is 5.42,  falling  above  the
critical  value  of 1.75.
23APPENDIX
1. Data
The production  function  estimations  required  data on value  added, capital, and labor. Value  added
was used instead  of total output because  of the unavailability  of intermediate  inputs in the Moroccan  data
set. The firm-level  value added was deflated  by an industry-specific  (at the two-digit  level) price index,
with 1985 as the base year.
Information  on labor provided by the annual Moroccan surveys included only the number of
employees  for each firm. This, however, is not a very meaningful  measure of labor input  because  it does
not take into consideration  the heterogeneity  among  different  types of workers and implicitly  assumes  that
all workers are equivalent. Since no information  was provided in the surveys on the skill level of the
workers employed, the only way of taking into account the heterogeneity  of labor was to express the
work force actually  used by a firm in terms of simple efficiency  units, the unit of measuruent  (or the
measuring  rod) being the minimum  wage. Labor input measured  in efficiency  units is simply calculated
as the wage bill of each firm divided by the minimum  wage prevailing  in the Moroccan  manufacuring
industries.  This of course implicitly  assumes  that wage is a good proxy for productivity  and skill, an
assumption  which usually holds if the labor market is competitive. Despite some rigidities in the
Moroccan  labor market, this assumption  seems reasonable  for the case of Morocco.
The ideal capital input measure should be in terms of flows. This, however, is not measurable
and only capital stock can be obtained. A capital stock measure was available  only in 1988  as the total
assets in equipment  goods owned by the firm. The 1988 capital stock was expressed in constant 1985
prices  using a wholesale  price deflator, and the perpetual  inventory  method  was used to build the capital
stock (in 1985 prices) forward and backward for the other years in the sample. Unfortnately,  firms
which were not included in the 1988 survey had to be excluded from the estimations  since no capital
stock  benchmark  was available  for them. At least two major problems  arise with this variable: it reflects
24book-value of capital and it does not include rented capital stock, Our measure of  capital stock Is
therefore a very  crude proxy of the true capital. An attempt was made later to  correct for this
measurement  error in the estimations.
2. Descriptive Statistics  of the Moroccan  Industrial  Sector
Table A. I provides descriptive  statistics  about the Moroccan  industrial sector in 1987. In tenms
of the number of flrms (column 1) and the number of labor (column 2), the largest sectors are food
products and textiles. However, in terms of the share in manufacturing  revenue (oolumn  8), the chemical
products sector emerges as a major sector besides the other two. This is fully understandable  given the
importance of phosphate in Morocco. Output per worker (column 6) is highest in relatively capital-
intensive (see the capital-output  ratio in column 5) sectors such as basic metal and chemical products.
Capacity  utilization (column 17), defined as the ratio of actual output to feasible output, is lowest in
textile and precision equipment  and highest in food products.
Concentration  is measured  in two ways. The first is concentration  in terms of the share of outut
produced by the four largest firms, CR4 (column  9), and the second is in terms of the share of output
produced in different regions measured by the geographic concentration  index (column 16). The two
industries  where a large portion of total output is produced  by few firms are beverage and tobacco and
basic metal, both being regulated  by the government,  while the most geographically  scatered industry,
as shown by tie low geographic  dispersion  index, is food products.
Ihe  public share in ownership (column 13) is the highest in industries  of national importace,
basic metal and chemical  products, while the foreign share in ownership  (column 12) is the largest in the
sector which requires  perhaps the most advanced  technology,  electronics.
By far, the most export-oriented  sector  is clothing  which sells over 80 percent of its output abroad
(column 11). The other sectors which export a relatively  high share of their sales are chemical  products,
25C-
which include  the derivadve  of phosphate,  and leather  and shoes. As expected,  import  penetration
(column  14)  is  b'gh in Intermediates  and  capital-good  producing  sectors.  Except  for beverage  and  tobacco,
these  are also  the rAost  concted  sectors  as shown  by CR4.
What  emerges  from  this  brief  glance  at the  firm-level  census  data  is a structure  of production  and
trade typically  found among  semi-industrial  countries  that have  largely  pursued  an import-substitution
industrialization  strategy.  Teb concentraion  in production  is characteristic  of countries  at that  stage  of
development  where  the small  size of domestic  markets  naturally  leads  to a fairly  concentrated  structure
of production.  The revealed  pattern  of comparative  advantage  is one  of a narrow  export  base in labor-
intensive  activities,  mostly  textiles.
3. Empirical  Estimation  of the Production  Function
The fixed-effect  model: The esdmation  resuts are shown  in Table  A.2. The overall  fit of the
fixed-effect  model  seems  quit reasonable  as reflected  by the adjusted  R 2. In general,  the  estimated  output
elasticities  with respect  to labor are much  higher  and much  more  signiflcant  than  the estimated  output
elasticities  with respect  to capital.  More  speciflcally,  all labor  elasticities  are positive  and significant  at
the  0.05 level  while  capital  elastiities are negative  in four industries  and significant  at the 0.05 level  for
only  four Industries,  and at the 0.10 level  for another  industry.  One reason  behind  these  results  is the
problem  of meaurement  error in capital  stock  which  biases  the coefficient  on capital  downward.
The time  dummies,  which  are mosly signiflcant  and positive,  show  a general  increasing  trend
that reflects  an overall  better  performance  across  year. However,  a steady decline  relative  to 1985  is
observed  In crtain industries,  such  as beverage  and  tobacco,  transport  material,  chemical  products,  and
"the fixed-effect  model  was alo estimated  by industry  and  by firm  size (arge vs small  flrms).  The
results  indicae  that in general  there  is no major  difference  in the coefficients  esdmated  across  size.
26rubber and plastic. It Is interesting  to note that most of these sectors have a relatively high public share
in ownership.
What about returns to scale? Conceptually,  two forces come into operation  when all inputs are,
for example,  doubled. First, a doubling  of scale permits a greater division of labor, and heace there is
soine presumption  that efficiency  might increase  -production might more than double. Second,  doubling
of the inputs also entails some loss in efficiency, because managerial overseeing may become more
difficult. Which of these two tendeucies  will have a greater effect is an important  empirical question. In
the case of Morocco, the estimated mturms  to scale exhibit a decreasing  rate for all but two industries.
The hypothesis  of constant returns to scale is therefore not supported  by the fixed-effect  model.
Correcting for measurement  ermr and simultaneity  bias: Two sources of bias in the previous
estimations  are dealt with. These are measurement  error in capital stock and simultaneity  bias in labor
input. The bias from the measurement  error in capital stock will underestmate the coefficient  on that
input. On the other hand, the simultaneity  bias in labor, which might be due either to the fact that labor
decisions  are made at the same time as output  decisions  or to the fact that firm managers  do observe  part
of the random  error in the production  function, will overesdmate  the coefficient  on this input Indeed,
if labor is endogenous  then an increase in the disturbance  of the production  function  will increase  value
added.  This in turn increases  labor. Tbus the distrbance of the production  funcdon and the regressor are
positively  correlated. An increase in the disturbance  term, direcdy implying  an increase in value added,
is accompanied  by an increase in labor, also implying  an increase in value added. When esdmat  the
influence  of labor  on value added, however,  the OLS technique  attributes  both of these increases  in value
added  (instead  of just the latter)  to the accompanying  increase  in labor. This implies  that the OLS  estimate
of the labor elasticity is biased upward, even asymptodcally.
27In order to  correct for simultaneity bias in  the labor input, we have fit  in Section II  a
simultaneous-equation  model  where the first equation  is the production  function  and the second equation
is a reduced form for labor demand (capital being assumed exogenous). This model could have been
estimated  using two-stage  least squares. However, another  way of tackling  the problem which allows  for
more flexibility is to use instrumental  variables  to estimate  the labor demand using a wider variety of
instruments,  instead of being limited to the predetermined  variables of the model (which is in essence
what two-stage  least squares does).
The instrumental  variables (V) method  can also be used to correct for the measurement  error in
capital stock. Moreover, if there is simultaneity  bias in the capital stock, it will be taken care of at the
same time. Thus, the IV method will correct for any situation  in which a regressor is contemporaneously
correlated  with the disturbance  term, whether  it is measurement  error or simultaneity  bias.
The major problem with the instrumental  variables  technique  is to find 'good'  instruments,  i.e.
variables that are highly correlated with the independent  variable with which it is associated, but
uncorrelated with the disturbance. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to instrument the deviation  of a
variable  from its mean, conceptually  and in terms of finding  relevant  instruments.  An easier way to tackle
the problem is to  estimate the production function in differences instead of  in deviations from the
mean1 4. This approach has a more palpable interpretation  since it reflects growth rates in the variables
(see Tybout and Westbrook, 1991). The difference  between  the last year of the sample (1989) and the
first year (1985) was used. The instruments  to be chosen should not be correlated with any demand or
productivity  shocks in those two years, but should be correlated  with labor and capital.
141  am indebted  to Jim Tybout for this suggestion.
28In the difference  estimation,  the capital stock variable  was slightly modified. It was actually  the
utilized capital stock that was used, which Is the capacity utilization rateu times the original capital
stock. It was possible to correct for the utilization  of capital in the difference estimation  because the
utilization  rate was only available  for 1984, 1987, and 1989. The capital stock of 1985 was adjusted  by
the average utilization rate of  1984 and 1987, while the capital stock of  1989 was adjusted by the
utilization  rate of the same year. This is a much  better measure of capital input since it reduces  the bias
on the capital stock estimated  coefficient  (see Kim and Kwon, 1977)  and therefore also reduces  the bias
on the estimated  TFP.
The following  instruments  were selected  for the growth in labor and capital stock between 1985
and 1989: 1) lagged valued of labor input  since it is correlated with labor as well as capital but it is not
contemporaneously  correlated  with the error term. The lagged  value of capital, however, cannot  be used
since it also incorporates  measurement  error; 2) equity and financial  cost, under the assumption  that the
fim's  borrowings  should  be correlated  with  the ability  to expand  inputs  but are predetermined;  3) average
capacity  utilization  (used to correct the capital input variable in the difference  estimation)  since they are
correlated with the capital input we are trying to instrument  without  being correlated with the noise in
capital due to measurement  error; 4) total surface-area  of the firm and real expenditures on heat and
transportation,  these being  correlated  with input  decisions  but independent  of any demand  or productivity
shocks affecting the firm; 5) foreign share and public share in ownership, since they determine the
amount of labor and capital used in a firm; 6) wage rate since firms decisions to use labor and capital
depend on the wage rate but the latter is not correlated with output.
Due to the fact that the variables in the difference production  function are taken as the growth
rate between  two years, the sample  size is dramatically  reduced. Industries  with a very small number  of
"The rate of capacity  utilization  is the ratio of realized output to feasible output, the latter being
defined as the maximum  output that can be produced given the available inputs of the firm.
29observations  or with  implausible  or insignificant  results  were  eliminated.  Ihe following  criteria  wer used
for dlimination:  any sector  with less than  25 observations  or any sector  with an R2 less than  0.1 was
removed.
The results  of the IV esdmadon  are present  in Table A.3. We detect an increase  in the
coefficient  of capital  stock  in half of the sectors  analyzed,  but also  an increase  in the coefficient  of labor
for most  industries.  Two  industries,  mineral  products  and  machinery  and  equipment,  have  a negative  but
insignificant  coefficient  on capital  stock.  Overall,  the returns  to scale  are higher  than in the pure fixed-
effect  model.
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33Table  I a  Import  coverage  (1984-1988)
(in  percent)
a  o  Imort value
1984  1986  1988  1984  1986  1988
List  A  67.6  66.7  81.8  84.2  86.3  87.3
Ust  B  30.8  33.3  18.7  17.5  13.7  12.7
Ust C  1.6  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Six-digit  CCCN  tadiff  code
Source:  World  Bank-UNOP  (199). fMorocco 2000:  An Open  and  Competitive  Economy,
Table  Ib: Selected  customs  duties  paid  by Imports
(January-June  1989)







Import-weighted  averae taIff -13.5%
Production-welghted  avge  tariff  - 39%
Source:  World  Bank  (1990), Susaned Investment  and  Growth  In  the Nlneties'
34Table  2: Productivity  indicators
(average)
SECTOR  Firm  TFPFE  MAXTFPFE DTFPFE  TFPIV MAXTFPIV  DTFPIV
10  FOOD  PRODUCTS  721  3.052  5.321  -0.426  2.362  5.246  -0.550
11 OTHER  FOOD  PRODUCTS  332  4.307  6.852  -0.371  3.045  5.127  -0.406 12  BEVERAGE  & TOBACCO  30  4.919  7.401  -0.335
13 TEXTILE  370  3.580  5.460  -0.344  2.452  4.269  -0.425
14 CLOTHING  504  3.382  5.176  -0.346  2.565  4.278  -0.400 15 LEATHER  & SHOES  202  3.323  4.922  -0.325  2.417  3.827  -0.368
16 WOOD  PRODUCTS  147  3.607  3.245  -0.378
17  PAPER  & PRINTING  276  3.245  5.218  -0.378  1.974  3.574  -0.448 18 MINERAL  PRODUCTS  242  3.673  6.104  -0.398  4.540  7.794  -0.417 19 BASIC  METAL  11  3.004  4.879  -0.304
20, METALUC  PRODUCTS  258  3.724  5.708  -0.348  4.167  .385  -0.347 21 MACHINERY  & EQUIPMENT  194  3.058  4.483  -0.318  3.185  4.577  -0.304 22 TRANSPORT  MATERIALS  92  3.763  5.723  -0.342  -0.376  2.497  -1.150
23 ELECTRONICS  101  3.900  5.426  -0.281
24 PRECISION  EQUIPMENT  21  0.613  2.568  -0.761
25 CHEMICAL  PRODUCTS  228  3.875  6.075  -0.362  3.854  5.737  -0.328 26  RUBBER  & PLASTICS  177  2.410  5.504  -0.562  3.431  6.514  -0.473 27 OTHER  INDUSTRIAL  PRODUCTS  27  2.635  5.372  -0.509
Note:  TFPFE  Is total  factor  poducdvity  calculated  from  the fixed-ffect model.
TFPIV  Is  total  factor  product  calulated from  the  IV  estimation  on  the  difference  model.
MAXTFPFE  and MAXTFPIV  are  the maxdmum  value  of TFPFE  and  TFPIV  respectiely  wlitn  each  sctor.
DTFPFE  Is  the percentage  deviation  of firm-level  TFPFE  from  MAXTFPFE.
DTFPIV  is the percentage  deviation  of firm-4lvel  TFPIV  from  MAXTFPIV.
'Firm' is  Itr  number  of firms  appearing  at least  once  between  1985  and  1989.
Some  sectors  are  omitted  from  the IV  estimation  (see  Appendix).Table  3: Estimation  of the effect  of trade  and market  structure  variables  on  TFP
(parameter  estimates)
Model  Model  2  Model  3
Dependent  var.  Dependent  var.  Dependent  var.
DTFPFE  DTFPIV  TFPFE
Indevendent  variables
Intercept  -0.177(0.066)^  -0.316(0.120)'  n.a.
FORSH  0.022(0.008)*  0.011(0.014)  0.177(0.039)*
SFORSH  0.114(0.020)^  0.148(0.038)^  -0.328(0.126)*
PUBSH  0.163(0.019)^  -0.015(0.036)  0.976(0.098)'
SHERF  0.346(0.048)^  0.021(0.096)  1.710(0.279)^
SHERFSQ  -0.282(0.072)^  -0.176(0.160)  -1.050(0.396)^
AGE  0.003(0.000)*  0.001(0.001)  0.016(0.002)'
AGESQ  -0.000(0.000)*  -0.000(0.000)  -0.000(0.000)'
PRODIV  -0.304(0.065)*  -0.199(0.119)"*  -1.807(0.329)'
GEODISP  -0.069(0.017)*  0.015(0.032)  -0.143(0.108)
IMPENET  0.274(0.026)'  0.303(0.047)'  0.503(0.199)*
IMPENETSQ  -0.399(0.035)'  -0.404(0.068)'  -0.934(0.238)'
EXSHARE  0.092(0.006)'  0.061(0.011)'  0.381(0.038)'
SECTOR  DUMMIES  n.a.  n.a.  included
Adjusted R2  0.18  0.03  0.48
Standard  error  0.01  0.04  0.33
F-statistic  72.54  10.50  4856
N  3931  3593  3931
Note:  DTFPFE  is the deviation  of TFP  from  the  effciency  frontier  (fixed-effect  model).
DTFPIV  Is  the deviation  of TFP  from  the efficiency  frontier  (IV  model).
TFPFE  is the level  of firm TFP obtained  from  the  fixed-effect  model.
In Model  3, sector  dummies  are  induded  In the estimation  but  are not  reported  here.
'Implies signMcance  at the 0.05  level; **  Implies significance  at the 0.10  level.
36Table  4: Estimation  of the  effect  of trade  and  market  stucture on TFP
(protected  sectors  vs unprotected  sector8)
DrotEcted  sectors  unDrotected  sectors
Independent  variables
Intercept  -0.161(0.079)-  -0.232(0.120)^ 
FORSH  0.020(0.009)^  0.029(0.016)^*
SFORSH  0.062(0.027)^  0.094(0.040)^
PUBSH  0.141(0.022)'  0.216(0.040)^
SHERF  0.381  (0.067)^  0.376(0.082)^
SHERFSO  -0.227(0.125)^"  -0.431(0.113)'
AGE  0.003(0.000)'  0.003(0.001)'
AGESQ  -0.000(0.000)^  -0.000(0.000)"*
PRODIV  -0.297(0.079)^  -0.283(0.119)^
GEODISP  -0.119(0.022)^  -0.022(0.033)
IMPENET  0.181(0.034)'  0.382(0.054)-
IMPENETSQ  -0.289(0.052)^  -0.539(0.062)^
EXSHARE  0.099(0.007)'  0.096(0.018)'
Adjusted  R2  0.18  0.19
Standard  error  0.01  0.02
F-statistic  72.54  21.89
N  3931  1090
Note:  The  dependent  variable  Is DTFPFE.
The  protection  criterion  Is  based  on the average  tariff.
The  protected  sectors  are: 10,11, 12,13,14,16,17. 20, 26,  27.
'Implies significance  at the 0.05  level;  ^  Implies  significance  at the 0.10  level.
37TablO  A.1:  The  Moroccan  manucturing seor  In 1987
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  7  (8)  (9)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)
SECTOR  N  L  YA  Lcosl  1(  9  cog  nue  CR4 Epots  Foreign Pubic  pen-  Tarilff  Geophic  CU 0  VA  0  L  margin shae  Sales  share, sae  tran  dipeson
10  FOOD  PRODUCTS  899 25103  16.9  38S  33.1 387M3  1160  12.8  26  1.5  5.1  38.3  4.0  31.3  0.11  60 11  OTHERFOODPRODUCTS  422 51293  21.3  37.0  19.3 20941  46.6  14.8  27  24.0  12.0  23.6  11.8  30.6  .21  41 12  BEVERAGE&TOBACCO  33  9807  72.4  9.9  21.3 50162  11.8  6.7  78  1.2  15.2  14.6  7.7  39.1  0.51  43 13 TEXTLE  464 55778  31.1  44.7  35.3 13108  585  9.6  16  31.7  11.6  12.0  37.5  35.3  0.15  25 14  CLOTHING  473 43718  30.1  55.1  13.8  7145  11.2  4.2  18  84.0  20.2  4.5  3.4  44.2  0.20  47 15  LEATHER&SSHOES  248 13363 2a88  55.2  38.5 11724  9.7  2.1  23  41.6  16.5  1.8  21.3  21.8  030  43 16  WOOD  PRODUCTS  194 10188 31.2  47.1  19.4 14930  19.7  2.1  38  20.6  14.2  0.0  42.1  29.4  0.19  38 17  PAPER&PRINTING  336 11957 30.1  37.9  36.4 267  69.2  5.0  47  11.2  22.4  17.3  17.4  37.0  0.16  60 18  MINERAL  PRODUCTS  305 258  45.4  30.0  70.4 16421  84.8  6.5  31  1.3  22.0  22.  a7  28.1  Q13  60 19  BASIC  METAL  26  2870  34.3  13.0  54.3 75631  4.2  3.2  81  14.9  3.5  83.9  53.1  9.1  0.57  58 20  METALUCPRODUCTS  328  16196 27.4  46.9  18O  20383  494  4.6  25  1.2  19.7  6.  17.6  31.5  0.29  41 co  21  MACHINERY&EQUIPMENT  202  6565  41.0  46.2  21.2 16061  28.4  2.2  50  0.1  20.8  5.0  68.2  17.2  0.20  34 22  TRANSPORT  MATERIALS  99  7654  32.9  37.9  17.0 29663  15.1  3.8  60  8.6  25.5  17.9  51.8  23.8  Q48  47 23  ELECTRONICS  110  9969  36.5  46.6  23.7 20691  20.1  3.0  35  11.1  27.7  10.3  43.2  25.9  0.30  54 24  PRECISION  EQUIPMENT  22  868  43.5  43.3  31.1 13634  5.9  0.2  45  3.8  17.6  0.0  83.5  2.6  Q.16  18 25  CHEMICAL  PRODUCTS  241 22284  19  388  48.7 55529  63.6  16.7  52  36.4  10.1  70.8  30.2  20.6  0.28  39 26  RUBBER  & PLASTiCS  195  8100  31.7  41.0  28.1 23129  22.9  2.5  45  5.4  12.1  1.9  22.4  28.6  Q65  52 27  OTHER  INDUSTRIAL  PRODUCTS 26  436  43.1  62.4  14.0  7618  -8.0  0.0  52  9.9  22.7  0.0  87.1  37.6  0.41  64
Note N-number  of firms;  L-labor; VA-value  added;  K-capilal stock;  0-production;  CU-capacity  utllzation. CR4  Is  the concentratlon  ratio  of  the four  lagest  firms  In  the Industry.
Variables  are  In  thousands  of  dlrhams  where  relevant.Table  A.2:  Producion  functdon  estimation  (fbed-effect  mode)
(paramee  etmates)
SECTOR  Kw4  hKp  OS  1S7  on  DO  R18  A1R1  aDW.  F-ag_  N  RFm
10  FOOD  PRODUCTS  0.78(.020)'  O.O  38)Q'*  0.050.008)"  0.70.0'  0.17(.0)'  002.2)'  0  0.M  0.20  48.9  27  03
1t  OTHER  FOOD  PRODUCTS  0.6410.021)' 0.031.(00)  0.0(.028)'  0.147(0.025) 0.17t1(0.0)-  Oi(0.027)-  0.7  0.01  0M  3.60  1255  324
12 SEVERAE&TOBACOO  0  0.020)  -0.13(0.013  )4.00  -. (0.02)  -0.021(0.027) 0.090(0.027)'  -0.156(0.027)-  0.703  OJ7  0.16  140.03  136  so
13 TECTILE  0.704(0.021)-  0.061(0.040)-  0.161(0.02)  0.156(.02W  020.028)'  0.242(0.028)-  0.75  0M  0.M  40.00  151  402
14 CLOTHING  0.1w.02)  4.0o4(0.04)  0.0  o.0)--  0.10o.pw  0.0o (.2)'  0.-25  0.7  0oas  0.  44.6  1616  42
15  LEATHER  & SHOES  0.672(0.021)'  4.0570.040)  0.1I5(.0M-  0.131(0.2  0.06(0.02?)'  0.0730.028)' 015  0.6  024  127  m  192
16 WOOD  PROUCTS  0.7o  .021)4 -60.0  4.0o  -4o0.0)  -4.09m0.027)  (.027)  07  0.1  0.4  o3  2  m  149
17 PAPER  & PRINTING  0.7(.020)  0.034.040  0.120.02*  0.129.02'  0.000.02)  0.000.027)  006  0.6  0.16  75.15  1133  M
1U MINERAL  PRODUCT  0.750.021)-  0.0U.08  0.131(.08-  0.144(0.0)-  0.06.0-  02.01.7  0.75  0.9M  O.1  so5  97  24
19  ASISOMETAL  0.7=P.0224  0.060p.045)  0.190*.0S  0  .1)'  0.01(0.00  0.100.0)  06S3  05  023  4ft51  74  20
20  METALLIC  PRODUCTS  0.7010.0-21) 0.041)  0.06W  06(.00)'  0.129(0.021V 0.111(0.0248  0.743  O9  0.25  3704  1044  24
21  MACHINERY&EOUIPMENT  0A".02t)-  0.023(00  40.061(0.0Mr  -O.06.68  0.117(0.02)  0.06(0.02)*  0CAM 0*1  023  3.07  02  135
22  TRANSPORTMATERUILS  0.702p.021)- 006(00  .0(0_  -4.006(8  40.0064.02  4.-(0.01)W  0.706  017  0.16  112.70  9  a
23 ELECTRONICS  0.80.021)*  0.006(0  0.10(00W  0.214(.  '  0.122(03  0.104(2)  0.66  0.4  0.10  89.37  347  96
24  P  1E810N  EWUM  1.1610  1)r  0  041r  -O*0  0  o00.02  0.0  .02-  0.100w  - 1.45  0.3  0.11  4*  75  1
25 CHMICOAI  PRODUCTS  0o0r  .021o'06(0.04  0.01  t02  0.071o  -o4  .0  4  0*0*  u.m  m  0o22 34.  6  s
2  RUSBERA  PLATICS  0.7450.02r  0.212(.0)  -4.1(0.02'  -4.057  2)  -06.024-0.127.(02  07  0.  02  30.1  4  161
27  0THER  IDUSAL  PRlODUCTS  00-  0  O  __-  0.2  06.02-  0.4420  101  0.  0.1l  1.7  6 
1600opofot--db!b1lln  _  wdwelop  Wm_ Nab:  Dspenduiw  oIS.  sppi(); tmn  Ard  m  ner  psIruuhsss..w  d)rAon 'Fn  mldsnumberdmsaperingW  a  mgsllbtwen  1t05d  1  N ls  db
06Dss  Urn  4hmIUs(uis  )wer  Is  1995;  RT3  s eNnb  _tos.
*Ips  lnlas  t6  0eb.05so;"  Imlslnllso  gts  010lee.Table  A.3:  Production  function  esimation  (Instrumental-variables  estnation on a difference  mode)
(parameter  estimates)
SECTOR  Intercept  In(L89)Hn(L85) ln(K89)-ln(K85)  RTS  Adj.R2 StLDev. F-stat  N 10 FOOD  PRODUCTS  0.123(0.088)  1.113(0.268)'  0.033(0.117)  1.146  0.16  0.69  9.80  93
11 OTHER  FOOD  PRODUCTS  -0.037(0.101)  0.643(0.194)-  0.201(0.097)-  0.844  0.15  0.70  11.10 110 12 BEVERAGE  & TOBACCO
13 TEXTILE  0.187(0.073)^  0.824(0.144)*  0.165(0.108)  0.989  0.20  0.61  22.18 166
14 CLOTHING  0.089(0.083)  0.723(0.080)*  0190(0.078)'  0.913  0.49  0.35  49.55 101
15 LEATHER  & SHOES  0.081(0.109)  1.016(0.145)^  0.039(0.103)  1.055  0.52  0.44  28.61  51 16 WOOD  PRODUCTS
17 PAPER  & PRINTING  -0.059(0.064)  1.187(0.176)'  0.024(0.052)  1.211  0.32  0.37  25.15 101
18 MINERAL  PRODUCTS  0.036(0.089)^  0.779(0.195)-  -0.119(0.103)  0.660  0.20  0.44  9.55  69
19  BASIC METAL
20  METALLIC  PRODUCTS  -0.003(0.074)  0.560(0.129)'  0.052(0.097)  0.612  0.15  0.52  10.82 109
21 MACHINERY  & EQUIPMENT  0.034(0.107)  0.871(0.176)-  -0.018(0.017)  0.853  0.26  0.73  12.64  66
22 TRANSPORT  MATERIALS  -0.204(0.145)  1.621(0.285)'  0.101(0.151)  1.722  0.56  0.43  18.01  27 23  ELECTRONICS
24 PRECISION  EQUIPMENT
25 CHEMICAL  PRODUCTS  -0.057(0.094)  0.723(0.168)*  0.014(0.079)  0.737  0.17  0.59  9.51  81
26 RUBBER  & PLASTICS  -0.100(0.130)  0.825(0.242)-  0.012(0.118)  0.837  0.13  0.68  5.83  63
27 OTHER  INDUSTRIAL  PRODUCTS
Note:  Dependent  variable  Is  In(Y89)-1n(Y85);  Standard  errors  In parentheses. ^  Implies  significanoe  at the 0.05  lovel; I ^ implies  significance  at the  0.10  level. Sectors  with  R-squared  les than  0.1 or with  less  than  25  observations  are  omitted. The  capital  stock  variable  Is  adjusted  for the  utilization  rate.Policy  Research Working Paper Series
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